Venue: BBS, salle sud
Available on Zoom: https://u-bordeaux-fr.zoom.us/j/87817347170?pwd=sUXG8z2zZPEjWP2bqIU7odY9JlYOre.1
John Bickle
Professor of Philosophy and Shackouls Honors College Faculty, Mississippi State University and Scientist-Educator, Department of Advanced Biomedical Education,
University of Mississippi Medical Center, USA
Title
Assessing Neurophilosophy and the Philosophy of Neuroscience, circa 2026
Abstract
Remarkably (at least to those of us who were there when it happened) next April 29 marks the fortieth anniversary of the publication of Patricia Churchland’s seminal book, Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain (MIT Press/Bradford, 1986). The fields of both neurophilosophy and the philosophy of neuroscience have expanded extensively since that landmark cornerstone. My Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry, “The Philosophy of Neuroscience” (Bickle, Mandik, Landreth, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neuroscience/) has tracked the twists and turns these fields have taken, with numerous updates over the quarter-century since it was first published in 1999. Every past revision added a new section detailing topics and publications that had gained prominence since the previous one. So while the most recent revision (last updated August 2019) presents a detailed history of these two fields, much of that history is now by and large forgotten, and only marginally relevant for scholars who want an introduction to current research foci. It is thus time to start again from scratch, and Gualtiero Piccinni has graciously agreed to join Tony Landreth and me to do this necessary overhaul.
Which episodes in the histories of these two fields are worth mentioning in a greatly condensed historical first section? The initial focus on intertheoretic reduction and its competitors as providing resources to reformulate philosophy’s mind-body problem? The rise of connectionism? The initial sketches, the early impacts and the subsequent dominance of the “new mechanist” account of explanation? The impact of the science-in-practice movement from the broader philosophy of science over the past two decades, with its emphasis on detailed case studies and on extra-theory aspects of science, such as experimentation, modeling and research tools?
What now are the defining issues of neurophilosophy and the philosophy of neuroscience, and which published works best reflect current debates? Candidate topics are numerous: recent challenges to mechanism as the correct account of explanation in neuroscience, even of causal explanation; experimental practices in both “wetlab” neurobiology and in systems/cognitive/affective neuroscience; recent accounts of ‘representation’ and ‘computation’ in the nervous system; neurocognitive architectures and “ontologies”; the neuroscience of senses other than vision and pain (for example, olfaction), and ultimately of consciousness; the rise and development of neuro-axiology, i.e., neuroethics, neurolaw, neuroaesthetics. Are there other “hot” or emerging topics? Whose publications are the canonical ones for these current concerns?
My aim in this talk/seminar is twofold. First, to report on the progress Piccinini, Landreth and I have made on this project. Second, to provoke a fruitful discussion with all participants to help us push this project onward.